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Responding to an increase in the rates of armed violence in 
the first half of the 2000s, in 2007 the Croatian Ministry of 
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voluntary weapon-collection programmes, and of the “Less 
Arms, Less Tragedies” awareness-raising campaigns has 
had a positive impact on the overall security situation in 
Croatia. As part of a series of broad policy changes and 
reforms, the implementation of these activities has helped 
produce a marked and steady improvement in the rates 
of crime and violence, whilst recovering vast quantities of 
small arms and light weapons, ammunition, and explosives. 
Keywords: gun policies, gun violence, gun control, weapons 
collection, small arms
1. Introduction
“Less Arms, Less Tragedies” is the title of a nationwide awareness-raising 
campaigns that was instituted in Croatia in 2007 to promote the “Citi-
zen Alert” voluntary weapons-collection programme (VWCP). Still active 
today, the programme has so far collected more than 12,000 firearms, 
300,000 explosive weapons and 4.7 tonnes of explosives, whilst the num-
ber of homicides committed with firearms has decreased over the same 
period. Implemented by the Croatian Ministry of the Interior (MoI) and 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the “Citizen 
Alert” VWCP appears to have been a resounding success, even prompting 
the former resident representative of the UNDP in Croatia to state in 
2008 that it had constituted “by far the most efficient collection of weap-
ons in the history of the UN” (UNDP, 2008). 
As reflected in the scientific literature, firearm violence and control are 
important topics in Croatia and in the Western Balkans. Hence earlier 
disarmament strategies have been thoroughly analysed (Faltas, McDon-
ald & Waszink, 2001; SEESAC, 2005, 2006) and the same applies to the 
illicit firearms market (Dragović, James, Mamić, & Mikac, 2018) and to 
those policies that control the licit and illicit arms trade (Grillot, 2010; 
Saferworld, 2007). However, despite their apparent accomplishments, 
the disarmament strategies that have been implemented since 2007 have 
not been studied so far in any way and are not well known by the aca-
demics and public health and arms control practitioners that form the 
international small arms movement (SAM). This is not only surprising 
considering their apparent efficacy, but also because their method of op-
erating includes a series of characteristics that break with conventional 
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wisdom regarding the successful conduction of weapons-collection pro-
grammes. For instance, there is no termination period that applies to the 
amnesty nor the VWCP itself, nor does the programme offer any kind of 
incentive beyond legal amnesty for those citizens who voluntarily turn in 
their weapons or explosives. 
These characteristics are noteworthy for a programme that seems to be suc-
cessful against the odds. Combined with its apparent efficacy, they make 
the Croatian VWCP a highly interesting case study that should be analysed 
in depth, which is the central goal of this study. It aims to assess the per-
formance of the “Citizen Alert” VWCP (2007–2017) and analyse the perti-
nence and effects of its particular characteristics. As has been the case with 
other prominent weapons-collection efforts, its lessons and implications 
may be highly relevant to other countries –whether industrialised or devel-
oping – that are facing problems due to firearm proliferation and misuse.
For this purpose, the authors have collected empirical evidence from 
different qualitative and quantitative sources. This has included the ex-
amination and analysis of academic literature, reports, press articles, and 
legislative documents; the requisition of unreleased or under-utilised data 
from official sources; and the conduction of ten in-depth interviews in 
situ with criminologists, academics, security experts, defence analysts, and 
members of the Croatian Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Defence, 
the Croatian Police and the Croatian Armed Forces (see Annex). 
The article is structured in the following manner. Following the intro-
duction, the second and third section provide a background regarding 
the theory and methodology behind disarmament strategies, as well as 
the policy context in which Croatian disarmament strategies operate. The 
fourth section analyses Croatian firearm culture, as well as the policies 
and programmes that attempt to counter their proliferation. The fifth sec-
tion presents the disarmament strategy that includes the “Citizen Alert” 
VWCP and the “Less Arms, Less Tragedies” awareness-raising campaigns. 
The sixth section presents the programme results and evaluates its perfor-
mance, while the seventh section discusses some of its most interesting 
elements. The paper ends with conclusions and a list of interviewees.
2.  Disarmament Strategies in Crime Prevention 
Contexts
In 2016 only about 18 per cent of all violent deaths worldwide occurred 
as a direct consequence of armed conflict or terrorism, whilst an estimat-
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ed 3 per cent were related to legal interventions. Furthermore, around 
78 per cent were classified as intentional and unintentional homicides in 
contexts that would traditionally be characterised as non-conflict settings1 
(Alvazzi del Frate & de Martino, 2013; Mc Evoy & Hideg, 2017). The 
proliferation of small arms2 among civilians is closely associated with this 
phenomenon. Firearms are not only the weapon of choice in around half 
of all homicides worldwide (Mc Evoy & Hideg, 2017; UNODC, 2017), 
but their acquisition and use by civilians can, under certain circumstanc-
es, promote a culture of violence, cause greater fear, and trigger a higher 
demand for firearms and additional violence (Sanjurjo, 2016; 2017; UN-
ODC, 2014; WHO, 2009). 
This vicious circle has not gone unnoticed by policy-makers. The 1990s 
and 2000s were exceptional decades in this regard, as small arms became 
the subject of an effective securitisation process (Buzan, Wæver, & de 
Wilde, 1998) that led civil society organisations, national governments, 
and international organisations to acknowledge the importance of reg-
ulating their use at all levels of governance (Grillot, Stapley & Hanna, 
2006; Hill, 2006). The problems related to small arms proliferation and 
misuse have an international and multilevel character, which implies that 
national governments cannot possibly respond to them without interstate 
cooperation. In consequence, firearm control efforts operate at different 
levels by means of international agreements and conventions, national 
policies, and local programmes (Krause, 2007; Parker & Wilson, 2016). 
Furthermore, some policies and programmes focus on the local context in 
which guns are embedded. This involves the adoption of a public policy 
perspective to approach the interplay between small arms and complex 
and specific relations of power, wealth, crime, and violence. These so-
called second generation measures (Krause, 2007) include security and 
firearm control policies, violence reduction programmes, and disarma-
1 The incidence and rigour acquired by lethal violence in non-conflict settings in re-
cent decades has led experts to rethink the classification parameters associated with this 
matter. The dynamism and multiple dimensions that characterise outbreaks of violence in 
countries like Mexico or Honduras blur the criteria that allow us to distinguish between in-
terpersonal and organised violence, or between political and criminal violence. In such cases, 
traditional classifications seem incapable of encompassing the violent phenomena at work 
and it even becomes difficult to draw a distinction between war and peace (GDS (Geneva 
Declaration Secretariat), 2011, pp. 11–42). 
2 For the purposes of this study, the terms small arms, firearms, and guns will be used 
interchangeably to refer to the following items: revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and 
carbines, shotguns, sub-machine guns, and light and heavy machine guns.
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ment strategies. The last measure includes the promotion of awareness 
campaigns and amnesties, as well as efforts to seize, collect, buy back, and 
destroy small arms, ammunition, and explosives. 
Such disarmament strategies – a term that we will use in this article as short-
hand for all such initiatives – show substantial differences related to the 
nature of the parties involved and the context in which they are execut-
ed. Programmes might be implemented to disarm civilians, insurgents, 
or even states, and they might take place in peace-building settings or in 
crime prevention contexts (Alpers et al., 2003; Karp, 2009). In any case, 
they are based on the expectation that restricting access to lethal weapons 
will result in a reduction in the level of weapons-related homicides, sui-
cides, and injuries (Wilson, 2014). It is a complex undertaking involving 
three distinct tasks: reducing demand, controlling supply, and recovering 
stocks (Faltas, McDonald & Waszink, 2001).
The disarmament strategies implemented in Croatia since 2007 match the 
profile of what Karp (2009, p. 161) defines as “civilian weapons collection 
and destruction”. Such programmes aim to improve public security directly 
by removing weapons from circulation, and/or indirectly by raising aware-
ness about the potential dangers of weapon possession. Participants are 
individual citizens who may be former combatants but are no longer organ-
ised or responsive to military command. The programmes are commonly 
organised by the state, but international and non-governmental organisa-
tions can play important roles as well. In addition, it is common for the 
actual weapons collection and destruction to be principally symbolic, as 
guns are meant to become part of a dialogue about social goals. Success is 
thus measured by the reduction of crime and violence or, more modestly, 
by changing attitudes towards small arms possession and use. Finally, the 
collected weapons are destroyed or incorporated into existing government 
stockpiles (Appiolaza et al., 2002, p. 282; Karp, 2009, p. 161).
Disarmament strategies in crime prevention contexts have become rou-
tine and widespread in recent decades but their results have been widely 
divergent. In fact, the idea usually prevails that these are not effective 
instruments to reduce crime and armed violence in non-conflict settings. 
This is because those who deliver their firearms in a VWCP – the most 
visible element among disarmament strategies – are usually low-risk users, 
without violent or criminal intentions. Criminals do not usually partici-
pate, unless there is some perverse economic incentive that allows them 
to deliver old firearms and access newer ones (Appiolaza et al., 2002, p. 
306; Cook & Ludwig, 2000, p. 123). Whilst this is usually true, the evi-
dence also shows that within the right context, disarmament strategies 
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can mobilise civil society and still exert a positive influence on local armed 
violence (Wilson, 2014).
In fact, the debate surrounding the efficacy of disarmament strategies 
conceals a nuanced reality. Practical disarmament is neither a silver bullet 
for armed violence nor a threat to liberty and security. Its impact can be 
largely positive – even essential in some situations – but is rarely sufficient 
to achieve major improvements in human security3 by itself. In order to 
have a positive impact, disarmament strategies must be comprehended 
within an integral policy to combat crime and violence: a lesson learned 
that is repeatedly pointed out by the specialised scientific literature (e.g. 
BICC & SAND, 2000; Faltas, McDolnd & Waszink, 2001; Godnick, 
2010; Karp, 2009; OECD, 2011). 
This realisation has led armed violence reduction and prevention initia-
tives to evolve in recent years and incorporate wider batteries of meas-
ures addressing indirect causes of violence. A good example thereof is the 
OECD’s “armed violence lens”, which encourages practitioners to supple-
ment disarmament strategies with broader measures tackling proximate 
and structural risk factors feeding crime and violence (OECD, 2011). 
Most contemporary civilian disarmament strategies follow this pattern 
and are implemented as part of larger policy reforms that focus on gun 
control, but also on law enforcement and the broader justice system. 
One consequence of such a combined approach is that it makes the out-
come or impact evaluation of disarmament strategies almost impossible, 
due to the difficulty of isolating their particular impact from that of other 
measures implemented at the same time. This is actually the case with gun 
control policies as well, or any other crime-related policy or programme 
for that matter, as alterations in crime and violence rates are influenced 
by a complex combination of policies and social factors (Cook & Goss, 
2014, Ch. 7; Ludwig & Cook, 2003; Santaella-Tenorio, Cerdá, Villaveces 
& Galea, 2016). Another challenge for the assessment of disarmament 
strategies is a general lack of information regarding small arms and users. 
Whether this is because of practical difficulties, weak official oversight, or 
ideological or political opposition to transparency, inadequate user and 
3 The human security approach was developed in the 1994 Human Development 
Report (UNDP, 1994), which led to a range of literature and initiative-building on this 
idea. In its essence, the approach broadens the scope of security analysis and security policy 
from territorial security to the security of people, stressing the importance of identifying and 
addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to survival, livelihood, and dignity (cf.: 
Gómez & Gasper, 2013).
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firearm registries are a constant worldwide (Karp, 2007) and police sei-
zures demonstrate that official registries only include a fraction of users 
and firearms in circulation (UNODC, 2015). Consequently, researchers 
and practitioners work with estimates that result from a combination of 
sources and methods. These include official registration data, independ-
ent estimates, and correlations from crime evidence and basic local in-
dicators (Karp, 2007). Whilst research has come a long way in recent 
decades, authorities are still mostly in the dark about how many armed 
citizens and how many firearms there are. 
Despite these challenges, it is essential for all disarmament strategies to 
include evaluation components (Appiolaza et al., 2002, pp. 311–315) 
and there are various ways of approaching outcome or impact evaluation. 
Hughes-Wilson and Wilkinson (2001, pp. 21–24) suggest a number of 
performance indicators that might be used. For instance, it is possible to 
estimate the percentage of weapons recovered by comparing the number 
of collected weapons with the estimated number of weapons present in 
the local community. Another indication of the impact of a programme 
is to compare crime statistics before and after the weapons-collection 
phase. Figures on firearm homicides, suicides, and injuries are especially 
useful in these cases. 
Due to the challenges discussed, such performance indicators cannot pro-
vide a truly satisfactory evaluation of an isolated programme. Moreover, 
they are not to be used to compare the performance of different pro-
grammes, as there are too many influencing variables at play that render 
such a comparative approach invalid (Hughes-Wilson & Wilkinson, 2001, 
p. 24). Nevertheless, their use will enable us to gain a more detailed idea 
of the performance of the Croatian disarmament strategy. The follow-
ing section presents the context in which gun control policies and pro-
grammes are executed.
3. Country Background and Security Situation
The dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1990 led 
to the independence of Croatia – one of six Yugoslav republics – in 1991. 
However, that same year the Yugoslav People’s Army invaded Slovenia, 
after which Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were attacked as well. 
The locally-termed Homeland War, or Patriotic War, began in 1991 and 
grew less intense with the arrival of UN peacekeepers in 1992. When 
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the fighting ended in 1995, around 20,000 had been killed and hundreds 
of thousands displaced, producing a massive movement of people across 
national borders and leaving profound ethnic divisions in the region (Tan-
ner, 2001). 
Despite the grim perspective, the country experienced a remarkably fast 
process of rehabilitation and recovery. War and independence were ac-
companied by a swift transition to democracy and the market economy, 
as well as by massive legal and administrative reforms in all areas of gov-
ernment. By the mid-2000s, Croatia was stable and peaceful, had a grow-
ing economy and a consolidated democracy, and its political elites had 
their sights set firmly on EU and NATO membership. These aspirations 
implied even broader and deeper reforms in order to meet a range of 
outstanding policy requirements on such highly diverse issues as minority 
rights, security reforms, transport policy, taxation, and media freedom, 
amongst many others. In addition, even though Croatia is frequently cit-
ed as a success of EU and NATO integration processes, the accession to 
NATO in 2009 and to the EU in 2013 did not halt reforms and policy 
changes, which continue to this day.
It is worth noting at this point that Croatia, like South-Eastern Europe 
in general, does not fit the profile of a “high-crime region” nor does it 
have a “conventional crime problem” per se (Getoš Kalac & Bezić, 2017; 
UNODC, 2008, p. 23, 35). Quite the contrary, crime and violence rates 
are much lower than the European average and all interviewees agree 
that crime has not been a relevant public issue for many years. In fact, 
according to Eurobarometer, although almost 60 per cent of Croatian 
survey respondents considered crime to be the most pressing public issue 
in Croatia in 2008, fewer than 20 per cent gave the same answer in 2017 
(European Commission, 2017).
The marked improvement of the crime and violence situation is a result 
of a sustained improvement of socioeconomic indicators, as well as of 
the many structural and programmatic reforms that the country has ex-
perienced over the last two decades. Although it is not possible to name 
them all, the most influential reforms with regard to crime and violence 
have probably been those concerning the armed forces, the police, and 
judiciary institutions. 
Military reforms began soon after the war, as the Ministry of Defence need-
ed to adapt the Croatian Armed Forces to assume their new role in a peri-
od of peace and regional integration. At the heart of these measures were 
downsizing, resettlement, and base conversion, as well as a transition from 
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a national to a collective defence system. For these purposes, military per-
sonnel and bases were significantly reduced to save costs, and the remain-
ing troops and stations were modernised to meet the criteria of accession to 
NATO (Edmunds, 2007; IMO, 2011; Pietz & Remillard, 2006). 
The Croatian Police underwent major structural changes as well, as the 
force was gradually demilitarised, reorganised, and professionalised. Two 
broad and structural reforms were especially noteworthy (Vitez & Balgač, 
2016; Vukadin, Borovec, & Golub, 2013). The first was the creation of 
a Police Directorate, an operational arm of the Ministry of the Interior 
(MoI), which would account for the transformation of the Croatian police 
into a modern and professional police force. The second major reform was 
the embrace of community policing as the police’s central philosophy of 
work. This was a structural transformation that implied building relation-
ships with local communities and developing partnerships and strategies 
with citizens to better reduce crime and disorder. 
Finally, Croatia’s judicial system underwent a complete overhaul in order 
to meet EU requirements. Amongst the most relevant reforms that fol-
lowed the adoption of comprehensive reform strategies and action plans 
in 2005 and 2010, was the amendment of the Constitution to strengthen 
judicial independence and to reduce political interference in the State 
Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils. The adoption of a new Penal Code 
in 2013 was also important, as was the long process of rationalising courts 
and state attorney offices, dramatically reducing the number of courts 
across the country and achieving a reduction in backlog cases (Dallara, 
2014, Ch. 2).
Ultimately, the impact of such structural reforms on crime and violence 
rates cannot be understated. Therefore, the armed violence reduction and 
prevention initiatives that will be analysed in the following section must 
be acknowledged and evaluated as part of these broader reforms. 
4. SALW Proliferation and Control in Croatia
The legacy of recent conflicts in the Western Balkans has been a signifi-
cant proliferation of small arms and light weapons4 (SALW) in the region 
4 According to the United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, 
small arms are designed for personal use and may be carried by one person, whereas light 
weapons are used by several persons or a crew and may be transported by two or more peo-
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(Grillot, 2010; SEESAC, 2010). Croatia is a case in point, as weapons 
embargos by the EU and the UN during the Homeland War (1991) and 
the lack of a national military force resulted in the militarisation of Croa-
tian society and motivated the acquisition of illegal weapons by the civil-
ians and combatants. Large quantities of SALW flooded into the country 
as their domestic production increased substantially, diffusing throughout 
communities and becoming largely available to civilians fighting for inde-
pendence (SEESAC, 2006). As can be seen in Figure 1, the proliferation 
of SALW and the long-term consequences of the war  – most Croatians 
have experienced widespread violence, victimisation, and atrocities – have 
had a catastrophic influence on post-war rates of violence (Getoš Kalac & 
Bezić, 2017). This can be seen especially in the rise of suicides and cases 
of domestic violence: two phenomena in which ex-combatants and war 
victims suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder play an important 
role (Bosnar et al., 2005; SEESAC, 2007).
The most thorough attempt to estimate the local proliferation of fire-
arms was made in 2006 by UNDP’s South Eastern and Eastern Europe 
Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEE-
SAC). There were 371,702 registered firearms at the time and, according 
to SEESAC’s Small Arms Distribution Survey, there were approximately 
597,458 illegal weapons in Croatia. This would amount to 969,160 civil-
ian firearms, in addition to 353,535 weapons owned by state authorities 
(SEESAC, 2006). The Small Arms Survey Research Institute came up 
with similar figures in 2007, with an average estimate of 950,000 civilian 
firearms (Karp, 2007). Most experts and practitioners who were inter-
viewed for this study were not convinced by these figures, however, and 
believed that the real numbers were much lower. This view was also held 
by authorities from the MoI, who recently declined the possibility of rep-
licating such a survey, as they did not believe that its methodology allowed 
a satisfactory estimate (CROATIA: NCSALW, 2014, p. 9). 
In any case, these estimates were made before the implementation of 
the disarmament strategies that will be discussed in the following sec-
tion. Hence the current “dark figure” is likely to  be much lower. One 
sign of this is that the number of registered firearms has been signifi-
cantly reduced. According to MoI statistics, there were 266,788 firearms 
registered in December 2017 (e-response No. 2), almost thirty per cent 
ple, a pack animal, or a light vehicle (UNGA, 1997). Small arms and light weapons (SALW) 
usually cover both military-style small arms and light weapons, as well as commercial fire-
arms (handguns and long guns).
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fewer than in 2006 (SEESAC, 2006). Of the currently registered weap-
ons, 259,517 belong to natural persons and 7,217 to legal persons, while 
90,908 are handguns (pistols and revolvers) and 175,880 are long guns 
(mostly shotguns and rifles).
Furthermore, SEESAC’s (2006a) estimation of the civilian arsenal equals 
an average distribution of 22 guns per every 100 residents, a possession 
rate that is neither too high nor too low compared with European coun-
tries. Germany and France, for instance, have estimated firearm owner-
ship rates of 30.3 and 31.2 respectively (Karp, 2007). Either way, firearm 
ownership rates are often illustrative of the national gun culture. In the 
case of Croatia, the influence of firearms does not seem to be especially 
strong, except perhaps in the Dinaric Mountains region, along the current 
border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (SEESAC, 2006b, 
p. 32). Most interviewees agree with this statement and the lack of fire-
arms in Croatia at the beginning of the war testifies to this as well. At the 
time, most weapons were hunting rifles and it was only after the onset of 
the war that Croatia experienced a significant growth of civilian arma-
ment (SEESAC, 2006, pp. 3–6). 
At present, hunting and sport shooting are still relatively popular in rural 
areas. On the contrary, self-defence is an infrequent reason to acquire or 
own a gun. This is probably because crime levels are low and insecurity 
has not been perceived as a menacing threat for many years. Proof of this 
is that even in 2009, when crime rates were higher than today, 89 per cent 
of survey respondents claimed to be feeling safe when they were walking 
alone at night in their neighbourhoods (GfK Croatia, 2009, p. 14). Most 
illegal weapons in Croatia are thus surpluses or “trophies” from the war, 
owned by ex-combatants and their relatives (SEESAC, 2006a). Moreo-
ver, owners are not interested in trading their weapons, which is why the 
Croatian illegal weapons market is considered to be small and relatively 
flat (Dragović et al., 2018). Ultimately, this makes Croatia an exceptional 
case, as disarmament strategies must work in a relatively peaceful crime 
prevention context, but one which has the weaponry of peace-building 
contexts. That is, civilians do not just own commercial small arms, but 
also an important number of military weapons and explosives.
Fortunately, the risks posed by the proliferation of military weaponry 
were not unnoticed by government officials. Above all, this was because 
the need to address firearm proliferation and control was an unavoidable 
challenge in order to meet the standards of Western integration (Grillot, 
2010, p. 155). SALW control was an important part of EU and NATO 
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screening processes, particularly due to Croatia’s geostrategic position as 
a transit area on the so-called Balkan Route for the smuggling of arms, 
drugs, and people into Western Europe (Dragović et al., 2018; Safer-
world, 2007). Therefore, various administrations made increasing efforts 
to tackle the problem, especially at the beginning of formal EU accession 
negotiations in 2005. This involved adhering to – and aligning national 
gun control policies with – a number of relevant Western European and 
international arms control regimes (SEESAC, 2010, p. 22), including the 
2014 UN Arms Trade Treaty. 
At the national level, there have been three especially noteworthy meas-
ures. The first was the establishment in 2005 of a National Commission 
for Small Arms and Light Weapons (NCSALW),5 an inter-ministerial 
commission that was responsible for coordinating all activities related to 
SALW disarmament and control. This included the development of a Na-
tional Strategy and Action Plan for the Control of SALW,6 as well as 
monitoring its effective implementation. 
The second was the adoption of the Weapons Act of 2007,7 which re-
placed the law of 19928 and regulated civilian use and possession of 
firearms. Compared with the preceding law and international standards, 
the Weapons Act of 2007 – and its three amendments in 2008, 2012, 
and 2017 – is a very strict piece of legislation (Dragović et al., 2018, p. 
7). Among the most important changes introduced were the following: 
the legal categorisation of small arms (A-prohibited; B-allowed, with pri-
or permit; C-allowed, with registration; and D-allowed), a very rigorous 
definition of what constitutes a justified reason for procuring weapons 
for self-defence, the prohibition of borrowing weapons, the annulment of 
shared-weapon permits, the drastic reduction of the terms of validity of 
permits and licenses, and additional conditions and requirements for their 
general obtainment.
The last important measure were the different disarmament strategies that 
will be analysed in depth in the following section. However, it is important 
5 Odluka o osnivanju Nacionalnog povjerenstva za malo i lako oružje (31.03.2005) 
[Decision on Establishing a National Committee for Small Arms and Light Weapons].
6 Nacionalna strategija i Akcijski plan za kontrolu malog i lakog oružja, NN 113/2009 
(21.9.2009) [National Strategy and Action Plan for the Control of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons].
7  Zakon o oružju NN 63/07, 146/08, 59/12, 70/17 [Weapons Act].
8  Zakon o oružju NN 69/92, 26/93, 43/93, 29/94, 108/95, 20/97, 27/99, 12/01, 19/02 
[Weapons Act]
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to note that the “Citizen Alert” VWCP and the “Less Arms, Less Tragedies” 
awareness-raising campaigns were not the first disarmament strategies to 
be implemented in Croatia. In fact, there were seven periods of amnes-
ty and collection of SALW between 1992 and 2002, the most popular of 
which were the UN-facilitated “buy-back” programme in Eastern Slavonia 
(1996–1997) and the nationwide “Farewell to Arms” programme (2001–
2002) (cf. SEESAC, 2006, pp. 52–56). In total, the number of weapons 
and ammunition collected voluntarily over these seven periods is quite high: 
33,598 automatic and semi-automatic weapons, over 1.6 million mines and 
explosive ordnances, more than five million rounds of ammunition, and 
over 7.6 tonnes of explosives (SEESAC, 2005, pp. 78–79). 
5.  The “Citizen Alert” VWCP and the “Less Arms, 
Less Tragedies” Campaigns
After several years of inaction, disarmament strategies gained traction 
again in 2007 with the launch of a new VWCP and a nationwide aware-
ness-raising campaign. The new enterprise was the result of a joint collab-
oration between the MoI and the UNDP on security matters. Croatia had 
supported SEESAC since its establishment by the Stability Pact countries 
and the UNDP in 2002, but their relationship grew stronger with the be-
ginning of EU negotiations. They began to cooperate on citizen security 
projects in 2006, in response to a marked increase in the rates of armed 
violence over the first half of the 2000s (see Figure 1). Arms control was 
at the centre of their joint efforts from the outset, but the Cooperation 
Agreement9 signed in 2007 established that the UNDP would provide the 
MoI with technical and financial assistance to collect illegal weapons and 
raise awareness about firearm proliferation.
The EU would also play an important role further on, as it decided in 
2010 to financially support SEESAC’s arms control activities in the West-
ern Balkans, which included assistance for the programme in question.10 
This was a way to implement in Croatia the 2006 EU strategy to combat 
the illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition: 
9 Cooperation Agreement between the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic 
of Croatia and the United Nations Development Programme in Croatia to Implement a 
Weapons-Collection Campaign and Raise Public Awareness (16.1.2007).
10 EU Council Decision 2010/179/CFSP.
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an EU policy that sought to bring its guidelines in line with the 2001 UN 
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade 
in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA). 
In any case, the legal and regulatory frameworks were provided by Article 
97 of the Weapons Act of 2007 and by the National Strategy and Action 
Plan for the Control of SALW of 2009. The main disarmament strategy 
consisted of three core elements: a weapons-collection programme, legal 
amnesty, and an awareness-raising campaign. 
The weapons-collection programme is included in Art. 97 of the Weapons 
Act of 2007, which compels citizens who are in unlawful possession of 
weapons categorised as A, B, and C to report them to the police for surren-
der or disablement. A toll-free phone line was established for this purpose 
so that citizens could call at any time, make a report, and obtain all the 
necessary information. Citizens were also able to use this mechanism to 
register permitted weapons or to voluntarily surrender legal weapons that 
they wished to get rid of. It is due to this methodology that the programme 
is referred to as the “Citizen Alert” VWCP (Dragović & Mikac, 2017). 
Once weapons, ammunition, or explosives are reported, the Croatian Po-
lice will send specialised officers to seize them at the owner’s place of 
residence or their alternative location. To preserve the owner’s public ap-
pearance, if circumstances permit, the police officers can approach his or 
her residence in a civilian vehicle and civilian clothes. The police officers 
will then issue a certificate to the owner or holder, accounting for the 
delivered goods. In most circumstances, the owners can also choose to 
keep the weapons in a disabled state. In this case, they have to apply for 
weapon deactivation within eight days of its surrender and bear the costs 
of disablement (cf.: CROATIA: MoI, 2007).
Complementing this procedure is legal amnesty – also included in Art. 97 
of the Weapons Act of 200711 – which clears citizens who report and volun-
tarily surrender their weapons to the police of any misdemeanour or crimi-
nal proceedings for unlawful possession. Amnesty is granted in accordance 
with the Misdemeanour Act,12 the Criminal Code13, and the Police Act,14 
but does not free the weapon’s owner from any further legal obligations that 
11 Zakon o oružju NN 63/07, 146/08, 59/12, 70/17 [Weapons Act].
12 Prekršajni zakon NN 107/07, 39/13, 157/13, 110/15, 70/17 [Misdemeanour Act].
13 Kazneni zakon NN 125/11, 144/12, 56/15, 61/15, 101/17 [Criminal Code].
14 Zakon o policiji NN 130/12, 89/14, 151/14, 33/15, 121/16 [Police Act].
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might arise from their prior use of those weapons. As is the case with the 
VWCP, legal amnesty does not foresee a termination period.
Finally, the VWCP and amnesty are strongly promoted by a recurring 
awareness-raising campaigns titled “Less Arms, Less Tragedies”. These 
campaigns were launched in a joint action by UNDP and the MoI in 2007 
and renewed several times until 2014 (Dragović et al., 2018; SEESAC, 
2011; UNDP, 2008a, 2012). The MoI has been carrying out its activities 
alone since then, although much less frequently and prominently than be-
fore (CROATIA: MoI, 2017b). The goals of the campaigns were to “raise 
public awareness of the tragedies that so often occur when weapons are 
handled irresponsibly and ineptly, to encourage citizens to voluntarily sur-
render all illegal weapons and explosives, and finally, to register all legally 
allowed weapons” (UNDP, 2008).
According to various interviewees, the financial and operative assistance 
of UNDP and SEESAC were fundamental for the campaigns’ implemen-
tation and success. However, the effective implementation was run by the 
MoI with the operative support of other ministries, local governments, 
and the Croatian Mine Action Centre. On the other hand, the involve-
ment of Croatian NGOs in SALW activities has not been significant. This 
is probably because even though many Croatians own illicit weapons, 
neither gun violence nor the illicit gun market have turned into serious 
public problems (Dragović et al., 2018). Some organisations did provide 
additional and sporadic support, however: above all, the Croatian Red 
Cross, the Association of Croatian Homeland War Volunteers, hunting 
and shooting associations, and civil society organisations at the local level. 
The awareness-raising activities were substantial and comprehensive. 
First, the organisers set up information stands in key public spaces of 
major cities throughout the country, where they promoted the VWCP, 
distributed informational material, and offered advice on new laws and 
regulations concerning weapons and explosives. The campaign was also 
present in the mainstream media through TV and radio ads, the internet, 
and print media. Some channels and radio stations even lent their active 
support, providing coverage and broadcasting campaign advertisements 
free of charge. 
The campaigns also had different target audiences, because an attempt 
was made to reach social groups that are usually at greater risk of com-
ing into contact with weapons. In cooperation with the Ministry of Ed-
ucation, the MoI organised workshops and lectures in elementary and 
secondary schools, during which specialised police officers would warn 
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children and parents of the risks posed by SALW and advocate for their 
surrender or disablement. These sessions included the use of preventive 
material, such as leaflets, posters, and comic books. Other actions target-
ed at-risk youth, as well as areas of Croatia that had been affected by the 
war or had a stronger gun culture. Children and women were also special 
targets of the campaigns, with the purpose of indirectly reaching their 
parents’ or partners’ weapons.
A final element of the awareness-raising campaigns was the public de-
struction of firearms, which was not a permanent feature but was included 
in some of its editions. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there were 
20 public destruction events held between 2011 and 2012, all organised by 
SEESAC, UNDP, and the MoI. The first took place in February of 2011 
in the presence of Croatian President Ivo Josipović, while the last was 
held in October of 2012 and marked the successful destruction of 30,000 
weapons recovered through different collection programmes (Dragović et 
al., 2018, pp. 19–20; SEESAC, 2011; UNDP, 2012).
At present, all three elements of the disarmament strategy remain active. 
However, several interviewees have lamented that the awareness-rais-
ing campaigns had lost much of its vigour in recent years. It is assumed 
two factors have been responsible for the decay. The first is the fact that 
UNDP has distanced itself from the programme due to its new relation-
ship with Croatia, because it has operated only as a self-funding project 
management office since 2014.15 The second important factor was the 
abolition of the NCSALW in 2015 due to the successful achievement of 
its mandate.16 Both factors withdrew crucial institutional support for the 
awareness-raising campaigns, which remained active and led by the MoI 
alone (CROATIA: MoI, 2017b). 
Finally, it is important to note that UNDP and the MoI carried out a 
second VWCP in four Croatian counties between 2007 and 2014. Indeed, 
the “Destruction for Development” programme was a highly interesting 
development initiative aimed at areas that had been especially affected 
15 This transition is a result of Croatia’s graduation to Net Contributor Country sta-
tus, of the completion of the extended Country Programme covering 2007–2013, and of the 
country’s accession to the EU in 2013.
16 The inter-ministerial commission had been established in 2005 with the task of 
developing and monitoring the implementation of the National Strategy and an Action Plan 
for the Control of SALW. In 2014, the commission considered that the 15 objectives of the 
action plan had been successfully implemented and proposed its own official termination. 
Consequently, the Croatian Government terminated the commission in 2015.
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by the Homeland War and which were thought to harbour the majority 
of illegal military weapons (UNDP, 2008b). With the financial support of 
UNDP and the help of the nationwide awareness-raising campaigns, the 
goal was to recover illegal SALW, ammunition, and explosives by financ-
ing small local development projects in those communities that returned 
the most weapons.17 Unfortunately, we were unable to find any informa-
tion regarding possible development projects carried out as part of this 
initiative, but the number of collected weapons and explosives suggest 
that it successfully supplemented the “Citizen Alert” VWCP.
6. Results
According to information provided by the Croatian MoI, the total number 
of weapons, ammunition, and explosives collected so far by the “Citizen 
Alert” VWCP (09/2007–11/2017) has been the following: 12,263 auto-
matic and semi-automatic weapons (category A and B weapons); 316,458 
mines and explosive ordnances (category A explosive weapons); over 4.8 
million rounds of ammunition; and more than 4.7 tonnes of explosives 
(see Table 1, [ponse No. 2).
As has been noted in Section 2 of this paper, it is almost impossible to do 
a proper impact evaluation of disarmament strategies due to the difficulty 
of isolating the impact of these particular measures from that of other 
measures implemented at the same time. The analysed VWCP and aware-
ness-raising campaigns are no exception in this regard, as these were only 
components of broader changes in gun control policies, which in turn 
were also framed within a series of broad structural reforms that took 
place for over a decade in many areas of government, including the armed 
forces, the police, and judiciary institutions (see Section 3). Unfortunate-
ly, the simultaneous implementation of so many related policy changes 
does not allow us to identify specific causal relations between particular 
programmes and alterations in crime and violence. This does not mean, 
17 The concept behind the “Development for Disarmament” programme has its or-
igin in the 1999 Albanian “Weapons in Exchange for Development” Gramsh Pilot Pro-
gramme. The idea is that development projects could complement the collection of weapons 
as a means of reducing public insecurity. To that end, the physical removal of weapons 
would reduce the supply of firearms, while development projects would reduce the demand 
for these by offering alternative occupations and improving social and economic welfare 
(Appiolaza et al., 2002, pp. 297–303).
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however, that the general combined impact of these reforms cannot be 
assessed.
Table 1: Recovered weapons, ammunition, and explosives through the “Citizen 
Alert” VWCP (09/2007–11/2017)

















2007* 218 4,551 312 188,944 132.72
2008 721 17,169 1,047 691,573 992.36
2009 637 13,476 1,324 352,313 351.93
2010 397 14,788 712 587,929 390.28
2011 316 7,882 721 389,031 326.55
2012 504 13,495 723 998,832 321.72
2013 292 8,899 691 442,991 315.32
2014 308 7,232 553 332,236 507.01
2015 529 8,042 680 356,971 343.43
2016 369 214,450 543 279,500 805.42
2017** 233 6,474 433 209,538 240.07
Total 4,524 316,458 7,739 4,829,858 4,726
Source: Own elaboration using data from the Croatian MoI
* The VWCP began in September 2007
** Data do not include December 2017
In that sense, statistics from the Croatian Ministry of the Interior and 
Ministry of Health suggest that the combined approach of these reforms 
has had a positive impact on reducing the number of homicides and su-
icides committed with firearms (see Figures 1 and 2; e-response No. 1). 
Total homicides and firearm homicides have shown negative trends since 
the beginning of the series (2000–2017), but the drop seems to be more 
pronounced for homicides committed with firearms. For instance, total 
homicides experienced a 67 per cent decline between 2000 and 2015, 
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whereas firearm homicides experienced an 83 per cent decline during the 
same period.
A similar phenomenon has occurred with suicides: following a sharp in-
crease after the war (Bosnar et al., 2005), total committed suicides have 
shown a negative trend to this day. Suicide attempts, on the contrary, 
have been growing steadily over the same period, but the use of firearms 
in these attempts was halved between 1993 and 2016.
This phenomenon is extremely interesting, as it suggests that the influence 
of firearms on crime and violence has decreased over the years in Croatia. 
Widmer & Pavesi (2016, p. 7) had already noted this curiosity in relation 
to Croatian firearm and non-firearm death rates, and suggested that such 
divergent paths could be the result of targeted firearm-related measures. 
This opinion is shared by the authorities of the MoI, who suggest that 
disarmament strategies were among the most influential reasons18 for the 
constant decrease in violence since 2004 (e-response No. 1).
Figure 1: Homicide numbers and percentage of homicides committed with fire-
arms (2000–2017*)
Source: Own elaboration using data from the Croatian MoI 
*Data for 2017 are up to and including November
18 Other factors would be the socioeconomic improvement experienced by large seg-
ments of the population, the refinement of law-enforcement techniques and overall perfor-
mance, and the successful conclusion of several criminal investigations regarding organised 
crime (e-response No. 1).
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Figure 2: Suicide numbers and percentage of suicides committed with firearms 
(1992–2016)
Source: Own elaboration using data from the Croatian Ministry of the Interior and Ministry 
of Health
* Data from the Croatian Ministry of the Interior
**Data from the Croatian Ministry of Health
Another possibility of assessing the impact of these disarmament strategies 
is to estimate the percentage of weapons recovered by comparing the num-
ber of collected weapons with the estimated number of weapons present 
in the local community. In this sense, SEESAC’s Small Arms Distribution 
Survey of 2006 estimated a civilian arsenal of 969,160 legal and illegal small 
arms in Croatia (SEESAC, 2006), whereas the pieces of automatic and 
semi-automatic weapons (categories A and B) collected by the “Citizen 
Alert” VWCP amount to 12,263. This results in an estimated percentage of 
recovered weapons of approximately 1.27 per cent.
Furthermore, the “Citizen Alert” VWCP was supplemented by the simulta-
neous implementation of the “Destruction for Development” programme 
(2007–2014), which also collected weapons, ammunition, and explosives 
in a limited number of counties that had been particularly affected by the 
war. This programme offered collective incentives to citizens who surren-
dered their weapons but was still framed by the legal amnesty of Art. 97 of 
the Weapons Act of 2007 and by the “Less Arms, Less Tragedies” aware-
ness-raising campaigns. According to Dragović & Mikac (2017), over its 
entire lifespan this programme collected 9,484 automatic and semi-auto-
matic weapons, over 87,691 mines and explosive ordnances, almost 4 mil-
lion pieces of ammunition, and over 3,3 tonnes of explosives.
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Thus, if we take both VWCPs into consideration and add all the pieces of 
automatic and semi-automatic weapons recovered, we arrive at a total of 
21,747 collected small arms (see Table 2). This represents an estimated 
total of recovered weapons of approximately 2.24 per cent.
















“Citizen Alert”* 2007–2017 12,263 316,458 4,829,858 4,726
“Destruction for  
Development” 2007–2014 9,484 87,691 3,988,457 3,340
Total 21,747 404,149 8,818,315 8,066
Source: Own elaboration using data from the Croatian MoI; Dragović & Mikac (2017).
*Data do not include December 2017.
Although 1.27 per cent and 2.24 per cent of estimated recovered weapons 
may seem low at first, these are respectable figures when compared to other 
disarmament strategies around the world. For instance, one of the most 
praised voluntary weapons-collection efforts in recent decades was the Bra-
zilian national buy-back programme, included in the Disarmament Stat-
ute of 2003 and implemented by the federal government and civil society 
organisations between July 2004 and October 2005 (Sanjurjo, 2019). The 
programme, which involved the payment of economic incentives for those 
who surrendered their firearms, led to the collection of 460,000 small arms, 
which was estimated to represent approximately 3 per cent of estimated 
private holdings (Dreyfus, De Sousa Nascimento & Guedes, 2008, p. 25).
Furthermore, we were unable to find information regarding the actual con-
dition of the recovered firearms. In any case, VWCPs are expected to re-
cover mostly old and cheap weapons, many of which are even inoperative 
(Appiolaza et al., 2002, p. 306; Cook & Ludwig, 2000, p. 123). However, 
this need not be the case regarding all recovered firearms. It is important 
to bear in mind that Croatian disarmament strategies worked in a relatively 
peaceful crime prevention context, but which had a surplus of weaponry 
from a recent war. Hence, many illegal-weapons owners have little practical 
reasons to hold on to military weapons that may still be functional.
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Besides, in such an environment the risks of proliferation are not only 
posed by small arms, but also light weapons and explosives. In this re-
gard, the implementation of both VWCPs allowed the additional recovery 
of over 400,000 explosive weapons (mines and explosive ordnances) and 
over 8 tonnes of explosives (see Table 2).
Ultimately, the application of these performance indicators allows us to 
suggest that the disarmament strategies implemented since 2007 have 
had a positive impact on the overall security situation in Croatia. Whether 
by themselves or most likely in combination with other policy changes and 
reforms, their implementation has helped reduce crime and violence rates 
in the country, whilst recovering vast quantities of SALW, ammunition, 
and explosives. Moreover, we were unable to find any negative impacts or 
consequences of their implementation.
7. Discussion and Good Practices
The apparent efficacy of the analysed programmes when it comes to re-
covering weapons and reducing violence is even more interesting when we 
consider that their operating mode includes a series of characteristics that 
break with conventional wisdom regarding the successful conduction of 
disarmament strategies.
The first uncommon element is that, beyond legal amnesty, the “Citizen 
Alert” VWCP offers no incentive of any kind for citizens to voluntarily turn 
in their weapons or explosives. This is not a novelty, but monetary or in-
kind incentives are usually considered key to a successful VWCP (BICC 
& SAND, 2000, p. 11). According to interviewees from the MoI, the deci-
sion not to offer incentives was influenced by bad experiences during the 
“buy-back” programme in Eastern Slavonia (1996–1997), where criminal 
groups used the opportunity to turn in surplus stocks and gain a profit. 
What is more, the organisers assumed that modern Croatia offered a fa-
vourable environment for a VWCP, as many gun owners saw no need to 
hold on to their weapons anymore. As suggested by SEESAC in 2006 
(2006a, pp. 25–33), the overwhelming majority of Croatians perceive se-
curity levels to be high, whilst four out of five reject firearms and consider 
their proliferation an issue of concern in their community. EU and NATO 
membership is also relevant in this regard, as it makes new military con-
flict extremely unlikely. Therefore, the time was ripe for a strong VWCP 
and additional incentives might have been unnecessary. 
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Not all agree with this opinion, however. Most unauthorised firearms in 
Croatia are in the hands of ex-combatants, many of whom had to endure 
important sacrifices and pay substantial sums of money for their weapons 
during the Homeland War (SEESAC, 2006a). Several interviewees argued 
that such owners would never participate in a programme that did not al-
low them to legalise their military weapons or at least receive some kind of 
monetary compensation in return for turning them in. As a result, the pro-
gramme would mostly collect obsolete and defective weapons. A possible 
solution to this obstacle might be the implementation of an additional pro-
gramme, which could offer non-monetary rewards for unauthorised weap-
ons that were still operative. Some interviewees even suggested the possibil-
ity of inaugurating a museum in which valuable military arms could be put 
on display, as a form of recognition of ex-combatants and their sacrifice.
A second unusual element of the “Citizen Alert” VWCP is that the par-
ticipants must call the police and wait for officers to come by their houses 
to collect their weapons or explosives. The reason for this is that many 
participants want to return mines, bombs, or explosives, whose transport 
requires extreme care and has to be carried out by professionals. How-
ever, this procedure requires high levels of public trust in the police and 
other security authorities. In fact, most VWCPs do not use military bases 
or police stations as collection sites and prefer churches, community cen-
tres, and other locations that are well known and seen as neutral (BICC 
& SAND, 2000, p. 11). The relative success of the Croatian endeavour 
reflects the trust that Croatians feel towards their police and armed forc-
es. Indeed, other state institutions do not enjoy the trust of the general 
population, but trust in the army and in the police seems to be relatively 
high (GfK Croatia, 2009; Vukadin et al., 2013, pp. 47–48): an attitude 
that is not common in most places where VWCPs are implemented.
Finally, the duration of a VWCP is dependent on many factors, such as 
available funds and logistical variables. In our case study, the lack of ad-
ditional incentives and the absence of weapons-collection sites allows the 
“Citizen Alert” VWCP to be permanent rather than temporary. Both the 
VWCP and legal amnesty are contemplated in Art. 97 of the Weapons 
Act of 2007,19 which does not include termination periods for either. This 
means citizens may surrender or disable legal and illegal weapons at any 
time, without fear of punishment due to unlawful possession. 
This approach has positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, 
permanent amnesty may not motivate illegal gun owners to participate, as 
19 Zakon o oružju NN 63/07, 146/08, 59/12, 70/17 [Weapons Act].
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there is no practical requirement to do so at any given moment in time. 
On the other hand, it enables potential participants to judge the pro-
gramme’s preliminary performance and decide to participate when they 
see fit (for instance, after they have been assured that the legal amnesty 
will be respected and that the collected weapons will be destroyed). More-
over, it reflects a stronger commitment by the organisers to the long-term 
goal of reducing armed violence and the proliferation of firearms beyond 
other considerations, such as EU and NATO membership.
8. Conclusion
In response to a marked increase in the rates of armed violence during 
the first half of the 2000s, the Croatian Ministry of the Interior and the 
UNDP launched a disarmament strategy in 2007 that consisted of vol-
untary weapons-collection programmes (VWCPs), legal amnesty, and 
awareness-raising campaigns. Ten years after its initial implementation, 
the present study has sought to examine the development of this strategy, 
assess its performance, and analyse the pertinence and effects of its par-
ticular characteristics. To that end, we have analysed the context and pol-
icies in place, and applied a series of performance indicators that would 
enable us to evaluate the impact and outcomes of these programmes. 
The main conclusion of this study is that the joint implementation of the 
“Citizen Alert” and “Disarmament for Development” VWCPs, legal am-
nesty, and the “Less Arms, Less Tragedies” awareness-raising campaigns 
has had a positive impact on the overall security situation in Croatia. Their 
implementation has helped produce a marked and steady reduction in the 
rates of crime and violence, whilst recovering vast quantities of small arms 
and light weapons, ammunition, and explosives. Moreover, we were una-
ble to find any negative impacts or consequences of their implementation.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that their impact on the rates of armed 
violence cannot be isolated, as these programmes were part of a series of 
much broader policy changes and structural reforms that took place for 
over a decade in many areas of government, including the armed forces, 
the police, and judiciary institutions. The impact of such broad reforms 
– in an improving socioeconomic context – cannot be understated. How-
ever, in combination with a strong disarmament strategy they constituted 
an indisputable and additional success.
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CROATIAN DISARMAMENT STRATEGIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Summary
In response to a marked increase in the rates of armed violence in the first half 
of the 2000s, in 2007 the Croatian Ministry of the Interior and the United Na-
tions Development Programme launched a disarmament strategy that consisted 
of voluntary weapons-collection programmes, legal amnesty, and awareness-rais-
ing campaigns. Ten years following its initial implementation, the present study 
seeks to examine the development of this strategy, assess its performance, and 
analyse the pertinence and effects of its particular characteristics. To that end, 
we analyse the context and policies in place, and have applied a series of per-
formance indicators that allow us to evaluate the impact and outcomes of these 
programmes. The main conclusion of our study is that the joint implementation 
of the “Citizen Alert” and “Disarmament for Development” voluntary collection 
programmes, legal amnesty, and the “Less Arms, Less Tragedies” awareness-rais-
ing campaigns has had a positive impact on the overall security situation in Cro-
atia. Their implementation has helped produce a marked and steady reduction 
in the rates of crime and violence, whilst recovering vast quantities of small arms 
and light weapons, ammunition, and explosives. Moreover, we were unable to 
find any negative impacts or consequences of their implementation. Nevertheless, 
it should be noted that their impact on the rates of armed violence cannot be iso-
lated, as these programmes were part of a series of much broader policy changes 
and structural reforms that took place for over a decade in many areas of gov-
ernment, including the armed forces, the police, and judiciary institutions. The 
impact of such broad reforms – in an improving socioeconomic context – cannot 
be understated. However, in combination with a strong disarmament strategy 
they constituted an indisputable and additional success.
Keywords: gun policies, gun violence, gun control, weapons collection, small 
arms
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STRATEGIJE RAZORUŽANJA U REPUBLICI HRVATSKOJ U XXI. 
STOLJEĆU: ANALIZA I REZULTATI ISTRAŽIVANJA
Sažetak
S obzirom na porast oružanog nasilja na samome početku 2000-ih godina, hr-
vatsko je Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova 2007. godine u suradnji s Programom 
Ujedinjenih naroda za razvoj (UNDP-om) pokrenulo nacionalnu strategiju 
razoružanja koja je uključivala programe dobrovoljnog prikupljanja oružja, 
zakonsku amnestiju i kampanje s ciljem podizanja svijesti građana. Od početka 
primjene ove strategije prošlo je 10 godina te se u radu istražuje kako se strate-
gija razvijala, nastoji se procijeniti njezin učinak te ispitati koliko je strategija 
relevantna i kakvi su učinci njenih komponenti. Autori analiziraju kontekst 
primjene strategije i važeće politike u državi te su primijenili nekoliko indikatora 
kako bi procijenili učinak i rezultate programa. Glavni je zaključak rada da 
je provedba programa dobrovoljnog prikupljanja oružja pod nazivom „Citizen 
Alert“ i „Disarmament for Development“, primjena zakonske amnestije i proved-
ba kampanje za podizanje svijesti pod nazivom „Manje oružja – manje trage-
dija“ imala sveukupan pozitivan učinak na sigurnosnu situaciju u Hrvatskoj. S 
jedne strane provedba svih ovih aktivnosti pripomogla je znatnom i postojanom 
padu stope kriminala i nasilja, dok je s druge strane rezultirala prikupljanjem 
velikih količina malog i lakog oružja, streljiva i eksploziva. Autori nisu utvrdili 
negativne učinke ili posljedice primjene programa. Ipak, učinak programa na 
stopu oružanog nasilja ne može se promatrati izdvojen iz šireg konteksta jer su 
se istodobno odvijale strukturne reforme i događale opsežne promjene politika. 
Sve je to trajalo dulje od jednog desetljeća i utjecalo na više područja, uključu-
jući oružane snage, policiju i pravosudne ustanove. Učinak tako dalekosežnih 
reformi u sve naprednijem socioekonomskom okružju ne smije se podcijeniti, no 
pretpostavlja se da u kombinaciji s moćnom strategijom razoružanja predstav-
ljaju nesumnjiv dodatni uspjeh.
Ključne riječi: oružane politike, oružano nasilje, kontrola naoružanja, priku-
pljanje oružja, malo oružje
